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70 Economic Instruments
Economic instruments (EI), such as subsidies, taxes 
and insurance-related options are at the heart of dis-
cussions regarding novel approaches for managing risk 
and adapting to climate change, including in the context 
of multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSP) between the 
private and public sectors (Agrarwala and Fankhauser, 
2008; Chambwera et al., 2014). 
Although the attractiveness of reducing and managing 
disaster risk has long been demonstrated (e.g., Fore-
sight, 2012), there is underinvestment into disaster 
risk management (DRM). A number of factors, such as 
a lack of comprehensive information and cognitive bias-
es are important. In particular, financial constraints and 
moral hazard, i.e. adverse incentives provided by current 
arrangements for dealing with disasters play a large role 
(Chambwera et al., 2014). 
In this line of thinking, instruments that provide a price 
signal for risk management and incentivise behavioural 
change hold high appeal by policymakers including in the 
EU (see Bräuninger et al., 2011). Yet, little is known about 
such economic instruments, their mechanics, links to 
risk management and concrete application in the field of 
disaster risk management (and climate adaptation) (see 
Chambwera et al., 2014). Knowledge gaps exist particu-
larly with regard to conditions that create enabling envi-
ronments for innovative market-based and risk financing 
instruments. Among these are, e.g., the attractiveness 
for stakeholders in the context of MSPs or institutional 
settings that are required to successfully and efficiently 
apply the EI.
Introduction 
and overview 
This chapter discusses the potential of EI for managing 
and incentivising risk management in the context of 
the ENHANCE project. The analysis debates how eco-
nomic instruments may support risk management, in-
cluding new partnerships between the private and public 
sectors. Based on an inventory, it applies different as-
sessment techniques to the most promising options by 
way of case studies, and finally gauges the potential of 
key economic instruments for incentivising risk manage-
ment generally via multi-criteria assessment. 
The guiding questions for this part of the EN-
HANCE project have been:
• What innovative economic instruments exist 
for managing disaster risk?
• How do they contribute to risk management?
• How do case studies discuss and assess eco-
nomic instruments?
• What can be learned from the case study ap-
plication using a common assessment frame-
work?
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Approach
Figure 4.1 shows the main tasks carried out for this line 
of work. A review of the available literature leads to a 
long list of potential instruments and their general ap-
plicability. Screening of anticipated uptake of the instru-
ments in key ENHANCE case studies via a questionnaire 
submitted to our case study partners produced a short 
list of instruments, which were implemented and further 
assessed via modelling and empirical analysis. As the fi-
nal step, a common framework based on multi-criteria 
analysis was applied to the case study instruments to 
assess their specific suitability. 
Assessment and review of
selected instruments:
- Static approach
- Simulation/optimising approach
- Agent-based modelling approach
Knowledge transfer
in both directions
Questionnaires
Case implementation:
- Assessment of case studies
- Feedback from case studies
- Insurance and risk reduction (incl.
  stress test), and other instruments
Inventory of economic
instruments:
- Long list (all instruments)
- Short list (selected instruments)
Case studies
Ex-post evaluation:
- Innovative and improved instruments
- Scale-up and generalisation
- Lessons learned
Figure 4.1.
Workflow for assessing economic instruments for managing 
disaster risk in the ENHANCE project.
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Private and public sector agents are tasked with managing 
disaster risks. While significant efforts of reducing and man-
aging risk are being carried out throughout many regions, 
recent evidence suggests less than optimal adaptation 
levels to current hazards and future changes therein, e.g. 
through climate change (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; 
IPCC, 2014) across all regions, sectors and societies. In fact, 
as discussed in IPCC (2014), given a diverse set of risks and 
manifold preferences, constraints and perceptions of risk, 
there is no such thing as ‘optimal’ adaptation. Yet, there is 
ample scope for ‘better’ adaptation and risk management. 
Risk management may happen autonomously or through 
policy intervention and policy instruments – the focus of 
our attention for this chapter.
Apart from insurance-related instruments, few adaptation 
instruments work directly via economic principles and us-
ing markets to adapt to impacts and risks. On the other 
hand, economic instruments can be used to indirectly in-
centivise behaviour and increase the uptake and efficien-
cy of adaptation measures. As one important reference, 
Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) distinguish the following 
incentive-providing instruments relevant for key sectors:
• insurance schemes (all sectors subject to extreme 
weather events);
• price signals / markets (water; ecosystems);
• financing schemes via Public-Private Partnerships or pri-
vate finance (flood defence, coastal protection, water);
• regulatory measures and incentives (building stand-
ards, zone planning);
• research and development incentives (agriculture, 
health).
Review of economic instruments 
for disaster risk management
Synthesising this, and in line with recent literature, we 
consider two broad types of instrument categories (see 
also Chambwera et al., 2014; Bräuninger et al., 2011):
1. Market-Based Instruments (MBI) are instruments 
administered by government regulators that provide a 
monetary/economic incentive promoting risk manage-
ment and adaptation. According to the EU white paper, 
the definition of MBI is broad (see EU Commission, 2009) 
and in the interpretation of this chapter it includes natu-
ral resource pricing, taxes, subsidies, marketable permits, 
payments for ecosystem services, licences, property rights 
and habitat banking. 
2. Risk Financing Instruments (RFI) comprise all instru-
ments that promote the sharing and transfer of risks and 
losses. They generally can be classified as pre-disaster ar-
rangements, and comprise insurance, weather derivatives 
and catastrophe bonds, and many of those are indeed 
market-based as well.
Three channels through which EI can contribute to risk 
management can generally be identified (see Bräuninger 
et al., 2011; Chambwera et al., 2014):
1. Direct risk reduction: as one example, risk financing 
provides direct compensation payments, which reduce 
follow-on impacts from an event.
2. Indirect risk reduction: incentives for risk management 
and increased resilience help to reduce and manage risks.
3. Managing systemic risk: both down and upside risks 
are managed, i.e. insurance takes down-side (‘bad risks’) 
risk out of investment decisions, which overall focus on 
harnessing upside risks (‘good risks’).
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Our inventory is presented in the form of a long list (see 
Table 4.1) and reflects instruments applied in the case 
studies. The EI are split up into the key groups mentioned 
above (see also Bräuninger et al., 2011).
Economic instrument Description
I. Market-based instruments
Subsidies Subsidies can be defined as a financial support/incentive from a government to an entity for implementing a practice or performing a specified action.
Grants
Direct payments or grants constitute the purest form of a subsidy. An economic entity 
receives an amount of money, which is supposed to induce the recipient to undertake 
a specific action bound to that payment.
Price supports
Price supports belong to the group of indirect subsidies although some direct payment is 
usually associated with them. In its most common form, the government defines a price 
floor for a good and pays the differential amount to the producers of the good as soon 
as the market price falls or is below this minimum level.
Pricing  
(taxes and fees)
Besides generating government revenue allowing public expenditures e.g. for a public 
adaptation policy, taxes can also be used to direct private behaviour towards a socially 
optimal behaviour. 
Land use taxes and fees
Land use taxes –we understand them as a tax on land and buildings – represent a pay-
ment either for the land ownership itself or for its kind of use. Land use fees are similar 
in nature, but they would by definition require some type of service from the collecting 
(public) institution in return.
Water pricing
Price to be paid for a certain amount of water or water/sanitation services. Double role, 
as financial instrument for cost recovery of water services and as economic instrument, 
acting as incentive for a more efficient water use. The EU Water Framework Directive 
requires the recovery of financial, environmental and resource cost of water services, 
considering the Polluter Pays Principle. The resource cost has been related with the op-
portunity cost (social welfare losses) of not using water for the most socially beneficial 
use. Efficient water pricing should incorporate a signal of the marginal value of water to 
the users. The design of the final tariffs for residential water supply involves the conside-
ration of conditions of revenue sufficiency, efficiency, equity and affordability.
Licenses, permits  
and variations
Environmental markets are based on the generation of demand for tradable units through 
regulatory decision. This demand then triggers the supply of units. 
Project-based offsets
A project-based adaptation offset could be generated by projects in regions where adap-
tation is relatively easy to generate, but where no governmental adaptation commitment 
exists.
Advance market commitment The government guarantees a certain income to the entity providing a desired activity, 
making this instrument comparable to a subsidy.
Other market-based  
instruments
These instruments specifically address the problem of overuse of natural resources, par-
tially picking up some of the broader concepts, like taxation.
Payments for  
ecosystem services
As long as the benefits from changing the ecosystem instead of conserving it are larger, 
a payment would be needed in order to avoid e.g. conversion of forests to pasture.
Table 4.1. 
Overview of economic instruments with applicability for managing 
disaster risk.
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Water markets
An intensification of unevenly distributed water resources and extreme events such 
as droughts, together with increasing average temperatures, calls for the efficient use 
of scarce water supplies. Voluntary win-win trades of water can contribute to reallocate 
scarce resources to the high-value uses, improving the economic efficiency and promoting 
the adoption of water saving technologies. There is a broad range of options (permanent 
transfers, temporary transfers, option contracts, spot markets, etc.), and even water quality 
trading schemes.
Habitat banking
Habitat banking aims at conserving the ecosystem services of land, including biodiversity. 
Credits are given for the creation, restoration and enhancement of habitats, while debits 
occur when ecosystems are unavoidably degraded or destroyed.
II. Risk financing instruments
There are many instruments for dealing with the financial burden imposed by disasters. At 
the most general level, we distinguish risk financing from loss financing instruments. The 
important distinction is that risk financing is purchased/ organised by persons or a com-
munity at risk purposefully and in anticipation of risk, whereas loss financing is arranged by 
people, governments and the state, often ad hoc, after an event.
Insurance-related instruments
Insurance helps to finance losses caused by extreme events. Insurance has the potential 
to be useful for adaptation in incentivising and enabling and risk reduction as well as 
enabling recovery and economic development.
Catastrophe bonds
A catastrophe bond is an instrument whereby disaster risks are packaged (securitised) in 
the financial markets. The investor receives an above-market return provided a specified 
catastrophe does not occur during the contract, but sacrifices interest or part of the prin-
cipal if the event does occur.
Weather derivatives
Weather derivatives are contracts where pay-outs are linked to physical ‘triggers’, e.g. nu-
mber of days with temperatures below or above a specified threshold, or rainfall above or 
below a specified level.
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During the ENHANCE analysis a questionnaire was used 
to identify the type and scale of economic instrument use 
across the case studies. This was then refined through 
detailed discussions with case study partners about key 
Application to the case studies: 
instruments and methods
Economic Instruments Empirical approach Simulation and  optimisation approach
Agent-based modelling 
approach
Grants, tax reductions Santarém, tax-financed  subsidies --
London, subsidies for flood 
proofing Rotterdam, subsidies  
for flood proofing
Land use taxes & fees Santarém, land-use tax -- --
Market commitments
Santarém, market commit-
ments -- --
Water pricing/markets Júcar, water pricing/markets --
Property insurance, crop  
and forest fire insurance
Santarém, insurance
Romania/Eastern Europe, so-
vereign and private market 
insurance 
market insurance
--
London, property insurance
Rotterdam, property insurance, 
incentives for flood proofing
Sovereign insurance  
and related instruments
Romania/Eastern Europe/EU EUSF --
instruments and the type of analytical methodologies ap-
plied in the different case studies. Table 4.2 summarises 
the set of economic instruments and assessment meth-
odologies used for the different case studies.
Table 4.2. 
Overview of assessment of EI and methodologies used 
in case studies.
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Simulation and optimising approach of water pricing 
and markets
Through simulation the economic impact of different 
policies/scenarios can be obtained for a particular set 
of a priori rules. In contrast, optimisation models direct-
ly provide the best solution in terms of the objective 
function and the constraints, recognising the opportu-
nity costs and economic trade-offs inherent in any de-
cision-making. This approach has been applied to the 
Júcar River Basin drought case study and focuses 
on water pricing and water markets as strategies for 
drought risk management (see also box below). It was 
also used for assessing European-wide risk sharing via 
the European Solidarity Fund.
Agent-based modelling approach 
Agent-based models (ABM) are useful as they provide 
a bottom-up approach for understanding systems and 
their behaviour, and are advantageous for visualising 
the effects of changing behaviours. ABMs can be used to 
characterise different stakeholders in a risk sharing ar-
rangement. Simulation of the hazard and losses can be 
used to assess the effect of different risk sharing options, 
and arrangements which encourage overall risk reduc-
tion. This approach has been applied to the London and 
Rotterdam flooding case studies, which focus on the 
role of insurance. These EI were found to be highly at-
tractive for MSP stakeholders with a significant link to risk 
management. There is also a high level of experience and 
evidence with regard to their application for risk manage-
ment and adaptation. 
Mixed methods approach 
Other cases used a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
empirical techniques. The EUSF/Romania case study 
focused on low-probability but high-consequence flood 
events and investigated the performance of the EUSF, in-
cluding robustness, solidarity and risk reduction consid-
erations. Beyond providing a detailed assessment of the 
Fund itself, the main goal was to explore if the formula-
tion of an EU-wide multi-sector partnership that could en-
hance the financial resilience of the Community. The case 
study followed a probabilistic risks analysis method for 
assessing flood risk on the Pan-European level, leading 
into stress testing of the EUFS. Beyond the stress testing, 
the case study investigated the Fund's performance in 
terms of solidarity and promotion of disaster risk reduc-
tion by conducting a modelling exercise and a detailed 
analysis of relevant EU policies. The MSP of Chamusca 
and of Mação performed qualitative and a quantitative 
empirical analysis, which entailed identifying a long list of 
economic instruments, relevant criteria and a description 
for each criterion, and participatory deliberation with key 
the stakeholders of the MSPs.
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Assessing water scarcity in the Júcar River Basin
Issue and instruments
The Júcar River Basin is a complex water resources 
system located in eastern Spain, highly regulated and 
with a high share of water for crop irrigation (about 
83%), in which water scarcity, irregular hydrology and 
groundwater overdraft cause droughts to have signifi-
cant economic, social and environmental consequenc-
es. The basin has been used as a test case to apply 
scarcity-based water pricing policies and water mar-
kets as potential instruments to manage drought risk. 
Scarcity-based water pricing policies are based on the 
marginal economic value of water (Pulido-Velazquez 
et al., 2013, Macian-Sorribes et al., 2015). When wa-
ter storage is high, the marginal value of water is low, 
while low storage (drought periods) is associated with 
high marginal values. 
Models and methods
In order to assess the impacts of these economic 
instruments, two new tools were developed and ap-
plied to allocate available water resources through 
simulation and optimisation approaches. The sim-
ulation tool (SIMGAMS) allocates water resources 
according to system priorities and operating rules, 
evaluating the scarcity costs through economic de-
mand functions. The optimisation tool (OPTIGAMS) 
allocates water resources to maximise net benefits (or 
minimise total water scarcity cost plus operating cost 
at river basin scale). SIMGAMS allows for simulating 
incentive-based water pricing policies based on water 
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availability in the system (scarcity pricing), while OP-
TIGAMS is used to simulate the effect of ideal water 
markets by economic optimisation. 
As the Júcar River Basin has a high share of water use 
for crop irrigation (around 80%), we also assessed the 
impact of drought on irrigated agriculture production 
using an econometric approach (Lopez-Nicolas et 
al. 2015). For this purpose, a two-stage approach has 
been applied (Gil-Sevilla et al., 2010 and 2011): first, 
an econometric model has been fitted to explain the 
impacts of water resource availability and crop price 
volatility on the agricultural production value. Mon-
te-Carlo algorithms are then used to consider the con-
tribution of the variability of the hydrology on drought 
risk and impacts. 
Lessons and insights
The results show the potential of applying economic 
instruments to deal with drought risk management. 
Water pricing policies and water markets have a pos-
itive impact on drought risk management, reducing 
the total scarcity cost during drought periods. Scarci-
ty-based water pricing policies send a scarcity signal 
to water users (when the storage decreases water 
price increases). So this works as an incentive to-
wards a more efficient water use, promoting high-value 
uses during
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MCA assessment of economic 
instruments for adaptation
Overview of synthesis assessment 
using MCDA framework
In choosing an approach to assess the costs and ben-
efits of a number of economic instruments, four major 
decision-techniques can be identified: cost benefit anal-
ysis (CBA), cost effectiveness analysis (CEA), multi-criteria 
decision analysis (MCA), and robust decision-making ap-
proaches.
We utilise an MCA methodological framework in this 
work to discover and quantify stakeholder and deci-
sion-maker considerations about various non-monetary 
factors in order to compare different courses of action 
(Huang et al. 2011). As described by Belton and Stewart 
(2002), MCA approaches ‘seek to take explicit account 
of multiple criteria in helping individuals and groups 
explore decisions that matter’. 
MCA is appealing and practically useful as it tries to take 
account of multiple conflicting criteria, provides a model 
that can serve as a focus for discussion, and a process 
which leads to rational and explainable decisions (ibid). 
MCA methods are desirable for analysing complex prob-
lems, as they deal with a mixed set of both quantitative 
and qualitative data, including expert and stakeholder 
opinion. The process of application is structured to enable 
collaborative planning and decision-making, as it accom-
modates the involvement of multiple experts and stake-
holders (Mendoza & Prablu 2003). While there are numer-
ous MCA methods, they all follow a similar basic approach. 
For any alternative, its total value score is calculated as a 
linear weighted sum of its score across several criteria. Al-
ternative approaches have hierarchical structures, which 
break dimensions into several sub-dimensions (criteria to 
indicators) (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
Regardless of the specific MCA approach, the selection 
of criteria and indicators for assessment is vital, and we 
build on analysis conducted by Bräuninger et al. (2011), 
which defined and populated a set of indicators to assess 
economic instruments for the EU, based on qualitative 
scoring and expert opinion. The criteria are outlined be-
low, with the introduction of a fourth, which deals with 
the environmental dimension of economic instruments. 
Regardless of the specific MCA approach, the selection 
of criteria and indicators for assessment is vital, and we 
build on analysis conducted by Bräuninger et al. (2011), 
which defined and populated a set of indicators to assess 
economic instruments for the EU, based on qualitative 
scoring and expert opinion. The criteria are outlined be-
low, with the introduction of a fourth, which deals with 
the environmental dimension of economic instruments.
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Economic criterion:  
Efficiency
Social Criterion:  
Equity
Political and institutional  
applicability
Resources, biodiversity  
and sustainability
What is the balance 
between costs and bene-
fits?
What distributional conse-
quences will arise? Will they be 
negative, i.e. regressive? Will 
the instrument be affordable 
and cover a high percentage 
of those affected?
Which types of adaptive acti-
vities can be incentivised by 
the instruments?
Does the measure reduce the 
quality or quantity of re-
sources?
What transaction costs  
will accrue?
Are there any specific barriers 
or conditions that are not 
covered?
Have policymakers applied si-
milar instruments? What have 
the experiences been?
Does it incentivise more 
sustainable management 
of resources, or encourage 
biodiversity protection?
How well does the instru-
ment incentivise disaster 
risk management?
Are interest groups likely  
to oppose such instruments?
Do measures decrease 
negative externalities related 
to human health? Do they 
encourage the use of linked 
resources?
For this assessment, we strongly relied on expert opinion, 
i.e. on ENHANCE analysts’ perspectives on the pros and 
cons of the different instruments, while involving stake-
holder views where possible. Scoring was jointly taken 
forward by the team involved in this line of work of the 
ENHANCE project in order to give broader insight into the 
instruments as they are supposed to support DRM. Sever-
al issues emerged while doing the analysis. These include 
level of generalisation of the results across case studies 
as well as questions regarding the context-specific nature 
of each case and instrument, as well as differences in rel-
evance of the criteria and indicators. The comparability of 
results across different cases remains very questionable, 
and therefore the results should not be necessarily viewed 
as a comparison across case studies but of viewing the 
case study in a more holistic manner.
Table 4.3. 
Criteria used in MCDA analysis of economic instruments, 
and motivating questions and indicators for analysis.
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MCA analysis of instruments: 
results
The MCA analysis covered five case studies, of which four 
dealt with insurance-related instruments, and one, the 
Júcar case, with water markets and pricing. We present 
results separately for the analysis of water markets and 
water pricing as well as insurance cases.
Water markets and scarcity-based 
water pricing in the Júcar River Basin
Two instruments were compared in the Júcar River Ba-
sin case for dealing with water scarcity: water markets 
and scarcity-based dynamic water pricing. The following 
section provides a qualitative comparison of the two op-
tions assessed, followed by results of the MCDA process 
(see Figure 4.2).
Economic criterion
In theory, both water pricing policies and water markets 
move water to the highest-valued uses, providing an ef-
ficient water allocation with a positive impact on drought 
risk management, reducing the total scarcity cost dur-
ing drought period. Water pricing would also reduce 
the demand in scarcity periods increasing the storage in 
drought conditions, which could avoid potentially larger 
future losses. 
Scarcity-based water pricing policies are pricing policies 
linked to water availability in the basin (represented by 
available storage) that integrate the marginal value of wa-
ter (MROC), sending the users a signal of the economic val-
ue of the resource and the opportunity costs. When water 
storage is high, the MROC is low, while low storage (drought 
periods) will be associated to high MROC and therefore, 
higher prices. So this works as an incentive towards a 
more efficient water use, promoting high-value uses dur-
ing drought periods, reducing the total water scarcity cost 
(forgone benefits due to deficits in water deliveries). The 
results for the Júcar Basin show that a significant reduction 
of water scarcity can be achieved with an efficient scarci-
ty-based water pricing policy, up to a 60% reduction of total 
scarcity cost (see Box above). 
A perfect water market (results provided by the optimisa-
tion) could further reduce the total scarcity cost of the sys-
tem. Results for the Júcar basin show transfer of resources 
from low to high value uses during drought conditions, al-
though with implications on environmental conditions that 
should be regulated in order to prevent this. Transaction 
costs might hinder the efficiency of water markets.
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Transaction costs associated with water pricing vary 
across methods and locations, and involve a fixed com-
ponent (installing measuring devices, setting up admin-
istration etc.) and a variable component that increases 
with water proceeds (monitoring and collection) (Tsur, 
2000). Beyond administrative costs, others can be sub-
stantial and difficult to value (Johansson et al., 2002), and 
may render pricing policies unfeasible. Since water scar-
city pricing is based on marginal water values and use, 
accurate pricing would require assessing volumetric use, 
which may not be implemented for some uses (e.g. agri-
cultural demands for use in irrigation), resulting in higher 
costs. While generating insufficient revenue is obviously 
not sustainable in the long run, strategies can be imple-
mented to guarantee revenue sufficiency. Markets also 
involve transaction costs, and can bring costs due to the 
economic and environmental externalities the transfer 
can generate. Generally, transaction costs of water mar-
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Acceptability
Conditions and barriers
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Enhancing biodiversity protection
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Decreasing resource quality / quantity
Decreasing negative externalities
Scores
Evaluation of water markets and pricing
Water pricing Water markets
kets are higher than of pricing policies, as it might require 
developing new infrastructure to transfer water between 
sellers and buyers. When considering bargaining and in-
formation costs (also transaction costs), water markets 
might become more appealing. 
In terms of incentivising DRM, instruments were not 
assessed to have a large direct effect, although scarci-
ty-based water pricing policies may indirectly provide an 
incentive towards more efficient use of water resourc-
es by promoting high-value uses during drought peri-
ods, and providing users with a signal of the economic 
value of the resource and opportunity costs. Economy 
wide macroeconomic impacts of water pricing (e.g. ef-
fects on GDP or GVA) are difficult to account, but there 
are some examples in the literature using input-output 
tables or computable general equilibrium models (e.g. 
Perez-Blanco et al., 2016).
Figure 4.2.
Unweighted scoring of water pricing and water markets in 
the Júcar River Basin case.
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Social criterion
Both instruments, pricing and markets, would contribute 
to the reallocation of resources to high value uses during 
water scarcity periods. Additional revenues generated by 
water pricing could be used to compensate low-value 
users for some of the losses they might face due to 
the price increase during drought periods using financial 
compensation mechanisms (e.g., Tilmant et al. 2009). The 
additional financial resources generated could be also 
employed to develop adequate infrastructure to in-
crease water security (for example, by financing desalina-
tion plant that reduces water scarcity). Water exchange 
in water markets is voluntary and represents a win-win 
situation for both buyers and sellers, but control mech-
anisms need to be implemented in order to avoid third 
party effects.
Political and institutional criterion
Both approaches lead to high scores in terms of address-
ing political and institutional criteria, as they are legally 
and administratively feasible in the setting of the case 
study, although some legal and institutional reforms are 
required for implementation in other contexts. Both in-
struments are consistent with other regulatory or incen-
tive-based instruments. However, in some cases water 
markets might face physical barriers to implementation, 
as it may be necessary to construct additional infrastruc-
ture connecting users. Scoring diverges in regards to ac-
ceptability by other interest groups. In the case of scar-
city pricing, acceptability will depend upon the perceived 
equity and the affordability of the rate structure. Water 
markets are expected to be more easily acceptable for 
farmers, since they would increase their income by buy-
ing and selling the water, while water pricing policies 
would penalise them. But it is also true that experience 
shows that water markets face many practical challenges 
for their implementation.
Environmental criterion
Both instruments score high in regards to environmental 
indicators; scarcity-based water pricing policies work to 
promote more efficient water use, enhancing high-val-
ue uses during drought periods. In this way, water pric-
ing can contribute to improving economic efficiency and 
social equity and, by using less of the resource more 
efficiently, lead to environmental enhancement. Howev-
er, we can be more efficient and use more water as well 
Photo by Tobias Arhelger/Shutterstock.
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Results of this analysis are shown in Figure 4.3, which 
displays a breakdown of the scores in what it terms 
‘sustainability scoring’, assessing options by separating 
indicators into economic, social, and environmental fac-
tors.1 While water pricing is scored as being slightly 
better in terms of environmental effects, water mar-
kets are seen to outperform water pricing in terms 
of both social and economic indicators. In any case, 
this evaluation only refers to the specific pricing policy 
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1 Political and institutional factors are not discussed separately as they would lead to the same scores for both instruments, as discussed above.
(scarcity-based marginal cost pricing) and water market 
scheme that was considered for the Júcar River Basin 
case study. There are many alternative options for pricing 
and water trading with many different economic, environ-
mental and social implications. This comparison does not 
intend to be exhaustive nor can be further generalised. 
Moreover, the two instruments are not necessarily exclu-
sive and can act as complementary options for mitigating 
drought impacts.
Figure 4.3. 
Average sustainability scores of water markets and water 
pricing for the Júcar River Basin case.
(as have been discussed in the case of the modernisa-
tion of irrigation systems, Ward and Pulido, 2008), and 
therefore, have a negative environmental impact. Water 
markets can also lead to a more sustainable use of wa-
ter through water reallocation to (1) more productive 
soils in more suitable locations, (2) more efficient water 
users, (3) higher-valued uses, and (4) new developments 
and the consolidation of water into more viable units, 
increasing employment and economic activity, and pro-
ducing environmental benefits (Bjornlund, 2004). How-
ever, unless explicit consideration is given to non-market 
uses or reserves set aside for the public good, markets 
may not deliver on broader societal goals, requiring to 
include adequate information on environmental needs, 
delivering water to meet these needs, and designing an 
adaptive process to manage these requirements with 
changing conditions and circumstances (Grafton et al., 
2011). Scarcity-based water pricing policies, by reducing 
water demand and reallocating water use, can also have 
an impact on environmental flows that need to be con-
sidered in the design of the pricing policy.
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Insurance-related instruments
The following section assesses insurance instruments 
analysed by the case studies of Portuguese forest fires, 
Rotterdam and UK flooding, and the EU Solidarity Fund. 
Instruments were assessed qualitatively according to 
each criterion, with Table 4.4 providing a short overview 
(see annex for a more detailed version, outlining the 
specifics of each case study) of instruments using the cri-
teria defined previously to structure analysis. The table 
uses a colour shading system to indicate the strength or 
weakness of an instrument with regards to the given in-
dicator, as assessed by expert judgment, i.e. building on 
researchers’ insights using quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. Green indicates that an option is perceived as 
scoring highly for a given criterion, with yellow indicating 
moderate ability to meet the ambition set out by the re-
spective indicator, and red being very little or no ability. 
Grey indicates areas of ambiguity or indicators that are 
not applicable to the option. 
Due to the diversity of cases and analytical tools the find-
ings should not be seen as a comparison between different 
cases, but rather as a stand-alone analysis of each case.  
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Criteria Indicator London Flood Insurance
Fire Insurance 
and market  
commitments
Rotterdam  
property  
insurance
EU Solidarity  
Fund
Ec
on
om
ic
Cost Ambiguous Low Ambiguous High
Transaction cost Ambiguous N/A Moderate Moderate
Incentivise DRM Moderate High Ambiguous Moderate
So
ci
al
Reduce inequality Moderate Low Low Low
Affordability Moderate Low Moderate High
Coverage Moderate to high Low Low to moderate Moderate to high
Po
lit
ic
al
 a
nd
 in
st
itu
tio
na
l
Institutional feasibility N/A Moderate High High
Consistency Moderate Low Ambiguous High
Acceptability High Moderate Ambiguous Moderate
Conditions and barriers Ambiguous High High Low
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t d
im
en
si
on
Decrease resource 
quality
N/A High Low N/A
Decrease resource 
quantity
N/A Moderate Low N/A
Incentivise sustainable 
management Moderate High Moderate N/A
Enhance biodiversity 
protection N/A High Low N/A
Decrease negative 
externalities
N/A High Low N/A
Increase use  
of linked resources
N/A High Low N/A
Table 4.4. 
Synthesis assessment of insurance instruments for DRM 
(see Annex for a more detailed version, outlining the specif-
ics of each case study).
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Economic criterion
Most cases diverged widely in their assessment of eco-
nomic indicators; the cost indicator - indicating how cost-
ly experts regard the instrument to be for the economy 
- varies on a case-by-case basis. The expansion of insur-
ance can promote the growth of the insurance sector or 
facilitate the development of economic activity; in which 
case it is a boon. The Rotterdam ABM shows that strength-
ening the link between DRM and insurance can result in 
the number of households buying insurance increasing by 
up to 63%, a rapid expansion of the sector (Haer et al., 
2015). As insurance is a transfer of resources from one 
economic agent to another in a mutually acceptable trade, 
a high premium cost is not a cost to society, as the price of 
the premium sends a viable signal of risk, allowing poten-
tial policy holders to make a more informed decision re-
garding the risk faced. However, insurance schemes tend 
to require (in)direct government support, which can be 
quite expensive, as vouchers to correct for unaffordability 
could cost billions of euros if offered at the national lev-
el (Hudson et al., 2016). These burdens may be balanced 
out with lower overall risk faced by society. For instance, 
in France and Germany the risk reduction potential of all 
households by 2040 would exceed the costs of providing 
insurance vouchers to correct for unaffordability (Hudson 
et al., 2016).
Beyond the cost of the instrument, cases generally report-
ed moderate or low transaction costs for the general pro-
vision of insurance, due to the well-developed insurance 
markets in which most of the cases operate. However, the 
aspects of the cases involving a greater connection to risk 
would possibly entail higher transaction costs due to the 
increased costs of monitoring DRM activities that specific 
policyholders conduct2. Private insurers commonly state 
transaction costs as a major reason for not strengthening 
the direct link between premiums and DRM (Hudson et al., 
2016). Competitive markets can help to keep transaction 
costs as low as possible. Moreover, in a period of increas-
ing risk the insurers must keep increasing their reserves 
to meet legal solvency requirements; resulting in more 
resources being invested in liquid assets with higher man-
agement costs.
Most of the measures assessed showed a moderate abili-
ty to incentivise DRM, even though in some cases, it was 
not part of the initial design of the instrument, and is seen 
as being very context dependent. For instance, the ABM in 
Rotterdam shows that premium discounts could increase 
the share of households employing DRM by, up to, 55% 
2 German insurers, for instance, find the transaction costs of offering and monitoring household level DRM are sufficiently high to prevent an active 
insurer based financial incentive for DRM (Hudson et al., 2016).
(Haer et al., 2015). On the whole, the incentivising ability is 
ambiguous and context dependent, as highlighted by the 
UK flood insurance mechanism which emphasises that de-
pending on its design and implementation, an insurance 
scheme can send signals to policy makers in support of 
flood risk management policies which would address risk 
levels, e.g. via changes in the planning system and building 
regulations. The new Flood Re scheme does not enhance 
this policy link nor the incentivisation of home resilience, 
which is a missed opportunity (Jenkins et al., 2016). The 
Portugal forest fire case provides a slight juxtaposition 
to the other cases, as experts asserted a high amount of 
incentivising DRM, since insurance application requires a 
Forest Management Plan and a Plan for Forest Fire De-
fence. The EUSF also found that recent reforms better 
linked the Fund to DRM measures, but only for flood risk, 
leaving more potential for strengthening the link to DRM.
Social criterion
The finding from most cases was that insurance had little 
to no effect on social indicators such as inequality reduc-
tion. The Rotterdam case emphasised that it is not a role 
of insurance to directly reduce inequality; insurance may 
have a minor role in preventing the worsening of inequality 
by providing compensation payments but this would only 
come into play after a disaster, limiting the role of instru-
ments in this regard. Both the Portuguese and EUSF cases 
also saw minimum potential to reduce inequalities, with 
the former instrument only benefitting owners of large 
properties, with no subsidies in place for support, with 
similar results for the EUSF, as significantly more aid is 
allocated to countries most able to withstand a disaster’s 
financial impacts. However, for the Flood Re instrument 
the scheme is shown to alleviate unaffordable premiums, 
which has a marginal effect on the number of instances 
in which mortgage payments become unaffordable and 
houses are repossessed (foreclosed) by the bank (Jenkins 
et al., 2016), thus slightly influencing inequality.
Responses on the affordability of instruments were 
mixed. Evaluators considered the Solidarity Fund as quite 
easily affordable for most member states, as they contrib-
ute based on economic performance, while for forest fire 
insurance, the instrument is affordable only for large prop-
erties with strong economic standing. The Rotterdam and 
London cases also showed mixed results; in Rotterdam, af-
fordability can prove problematic for some (potential) poli-
cyholders if the link with risk is increased as proposed then 
high-risk households (with risk adverse insurers) will face 
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very high premiums (Hudson et al., 2016). However, the 
increased use of risk-based pricing means less cross-sub-
sidisation and lower insurance premiums for those at low-
er risk. In the UK, Flood Re is understood to achieve the 
provision of affordable insurance. As technical risk prices 
increase (reflecting increased flood risk), Flood Re reduces 
average premiums from approximately £650 to £280 in 
the baseline scenario. Even under future climate change 
scenarios average premiums are limited to £450 - £550 
by year 30. Experiments without Flood Re illustrate much 
higher and steeper increases in average flood insurance 
premiums, upwards to £1700 under the 2050 high sce-
nario. However, this also presents a clear challenge for the 
aim of using Flood Re as a temporary measure, before al-
lowing risk based pricing after 25 years. As the technical 
price and the subsidised price for insurance are expected 
to diverge more and more it remains highly unclear how 
the system would lead to affordable risk based premiums 
after Flood Re stops its operation.
Institutional and political criterion
In terms of institutional and political indicators, cases var-
ied widely. Insurance can score highly on aspects such as 
feasibility, and several countries have developed the re-
quired institutions for a viable insurance market with risk-
based premiums. The EUSF, for example, is fully feasible 
and is in operation, whereas the Flood Re scheme is not 
yet operational, so its feasibility cannot be adequately as-
sessed. In Portugal, a legal framework for fire insurance 
exists, but is not associated to any support from EU or do-
mestic institutions to decrease premium costs. 
However, cases diverged on how their instruments were 
scored with regard to consistency. The Rotterdam case 
emphasised that assessing consistency is ambiguous as it 
is dependent on the link with DRM. The stronger the over-
all link with DRM, the more able insurance is to increase 
resilience against natural hazards. The London case ob-
served that investment in sustainable drainage system 
(also in combination with property-level protection meas-
ures) can help to stabilise insurance premiums over time 
– a clear indicator that surface water risk management is 
essential to maintain the viability of flood insurance.
The overall acceptability of instruments can be regarded 
as mostly high and moderate among cases, with some ca-
veats. The Flood Re instrument study highlighted that both 
property developers and the local government could con-
tribute to flood risk reduction, but are not part of the flood 
insurance MSP. One aspect that warrants further investi-
gation is how Flood Re could be strengthened or expand-
ed to contribute more significantly to flood risk reduction. 
The Portuguese fire insurance instrument was seen to 
have high acceptability among other interest groups be-
sides the current users, contingent on the lowering of pre-
miums. For the Solidarity Fund, acceptability was viewed 
as only moderate, due to strong concerns from some 
stakeholders, namely the insurance industry. The Rotter-
dam property insurance instrument was more ambiguous. 
Possible reforms will result in certain premiums increasing 
(and others reducing), thus limiting (or improving) the ac-
ceptability of the reform. 
The case studies saw a number of different conditions 
and barriers to introduction of the EI, as in Rotterdam 
where the potential height of insurance premiums forms 
a strong barrier. Moreover, insurance reforms tend to be 
highly politically contentious between major stakeholders, 
which can limit stakeholder buy-in without considerable 
time and patience being expended. In regards to fire in-
surance, the absence of reliable information on risk, and 
limited incentives for coverage to small properties was 
seen as detrimental to encouraging insurance companies 
to provide coverage. 
Environmental criterion
For most environmental considerations, for the major-
ity of instruments there was not a good match with the 
indicators. Generally speaking, the Rotterdam case em-
phasised that while insurance was not directly tied to an 
environmental criterion, there may be some negative im-
plications, as property insurance can facilitate economic 
activity that may lead to an increase in the magnitude of 
externalities. Conversely, incentivising DRM can also en-
courage sustainable management; agents are made 
aware of the risk and only locate economic activity in risky 
areas if it is worth the risk or cost of insurance. Greater 
interaction between insurers and planning agencies can 
provide guidance on the land use management strategies 
that would alter the overall risk in an area, highlighting the 
benefits of public-private partnerships.
The only instrument which consistently scored beneficial 
in this regard was Portuguese fire insurance, which is pro-
jected to increase quality of resources, due to adequate 
forest management resulting from those participating 
in the instrument being required to submit forest man-
agement plans. The instrument can also encourage the 
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protection of biodiversity via improved protection against 
wildfires due to management plans and the application 
of the Plan for Forest Fire Defence, and has the poten-
tial to reduce human impacts due to wildfires via fire de-
fence plans, as well as increasing most ecosystem services 
through the application of forest management plans.
Photo by cohdra/Morguefile.
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Conclusions
This chapter presented the findings from several EN-
HANCE case studies with regards to the use economic in-
struments for disaster risk management in the EU.  After 
an overview of the different instruments in operation we 
reflected briefly on the different analytical tools applied 
across the cases. We presented lessons and insights from 
each case and synthesised these via a common frame-
work, using an MCA-based approach. We conclude by re-
flecting on the use of MCA, observations from the synthe-
sis of case instruments, and general recommendations for 
further policy and research.
Use of MCA in assessing economic instruments
While MCA approaches have proven useful time and 
again in terms of assessing options and decision-support, 
full use of MCA was limited in scope within this work. De-
tailed MCA is time-consuming and requires common un-
derstanding by participants of all options being assessed, 
as well as the criteria and indicators being used to ‘grade’ 
such options. This is usually done via a set of participatory 
process of workshops and communication. 
We found the initial use of an MCA tool to rank insurance 
options to be associated with a number of problems, of 
which two factors are particularly relevant: (1) the con-
text-specific nature of each insurance instrument, which 
differs widely from case to case, as well as (2) differing 
understandings of what each indicator was supposed to 
mean, e.g. the participants’ understanding of what is in-
cluded when considering a cost or transaction cost ranking 
for an instrument. An MCA ranking of insurance options 
also led to imply that the options were similar enough to 
be compared, whereas experts felt they were all rather lo-
cal and context-specific to be assessed in such a way as 
would imply their similarity or substitutability. 
However, there was generally a belief that the MCA pro-
cess was suitable for the assessment of water markets and 
pricing in the Santarem case, as two options to address a 
single problem in a single location were being assessed by 
the same group of experts and stakeholders. In this case, 
the use of MCA can be seen as more robust, and the re-
sults more meaningful, as the problems listed above for 
the insurance options were not that relevant for this case. 
Even though we identified a number of challenges for the 
entire MCA process when evaluating the various insur-
ance mechanisms, the study team considered the consist-
ent framework of criteria and indicators as useful to lead 
to some common understanding and base for assessing 
each instrument. Instead of using a quantitative scoring 
system, we took a more qualitative approach forward 
which allowed for greater understanding of each case 
instrument. In addition, it helped to synthesise the dif-
ferent instruments by providing a common framing 
and ability to compare where certain instruments per-
form better than others, keeping in mind, however, the 
limits to comparability across cases.
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Synthesis 
Table 4.4 provides a compact synthesis of economic in-
struments assessed and summarises the observations 
for each indicator. For the most part, instruments appear 
very context- and location-specific; while all EI listed are 
insurance instruments, there exists a great variety as to 
how they perform against individual indicators, showing 
the complexity and importance of considering the eco-
nomic, social, political, and environmental conditions and 
effects of the instrument.
In terms of commonalities, far less can be said, other than 
two general similarities having to do with inequality and in-
centivising DRM. The effects of insurance instruments on 
inequality were seen to be mostly low, as it is not the role 
of insurance to directly reduce inequality. Some potential 
emerged for indirect effects, but generally, such instru-
ments were seen to be a non-factor in this regard. Con-
versely, and as possibly expected, the analysis led to sug-
gest that most instruments are beneficial in incentivising 
DRM, or at least, having good potential to do so, with premi-
ums possibly being linked to DRM implementation and de-
signing of options to be strongly linked to DRM measures. 
Beyond this, instruments varied from indicator to indica-
tor, with little similarity. Overall, we suggest the synthesis 
assessment can be useful in that it provides a common 
set of criteria, and when used with a variety of similar in-
struments such as in this case, can highlight approach-
es which are successful at meeting said criteria, and 
which are not, benefiting the design of future instruments 
by learning from the outcomes of others in a structured 
manner such as here. An example might be improving an 
option’s performance in the environmental dimension; 
most instruments were seen as not applicable or having 
very low scores in this regard, with the exception of the 
fire insurance instrument, which mandated that in order 
to join the scheme, forest management and fire defence 
plans must be completed. If other instruments had similar 
requirements tailored to their individual hazard and con-
text, it could improve their effectiveness in regards to this 
criterion in the future. At the very least, the synthesis al-
lows us to highlight areas of ‘good’ and ‘incipient’ prac-
tice, benefitting future research and policy design. 
Recommendations for policy and research
As mentioned, the synthesis of economic instruments al-
lowed the study team to highlight the diversity in results 
from case to case and instrument to instrument, providing 
a set of examples. This can be interpreted as a roadmap 
of practices, and using a similar set of criteria to assess a 
number of instruments can lead to identifying examples 
which work in certain contexts, that can then be tailored to 
fit others (e.g. the use of forest management plans as an 
example of how to include an environmental dimension 
when considering similar plans in the future). 
We suggest that the MCA framework is also useful in that 
it provides a common, structured approach for look-
ing at an instrument, and that it emphasises the need 
to focus on multiple factors. Assessing multiple options 
in this manner enables more comparisons to be made, 
and more learning from others’ experience, even if it is not 
directly relevant (e.g. deals with different hazards or spatial 
scales etc.) Such a framing could be used when designing 
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a new instrument, and could be used to catalogue those 
currently in existence, to provide an easy way to compare 
options and to find new innovations for improving current 
instruments or when designing new ones. 
Working with an MCA approach has indeed highlighted the 
need for consistency and understanding when assessing 
options in terms of criteria and indicators used, and what 
each entails. What constitutes a cost, or a transaction cost? 
How does one score an option in regards to incentivising 
sustainable management? In order to compare options 
beyond a qualitative assessment, more structured interac-
tion is needed between experts and stakeholders carrying 
out the analysis. This has important implications for the 
comparability across case studies – and therefore the re-
sults highlighted in Table 4.4 should be seen as an illustra-
tion of each case, but not necessarily a comparison across 
cases. With further work and interaction, the assessment, 
particularly on the insurance instruments, might be taken 
forward by moving from qualitative aspects to ranking op-
tions numerically as well as weighting their importance, but 
only after working towards a more thorough understand-
ing of all options involved - an avenue for further research.
Photo by Dominik Martin/Unsplash.
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Criteria Indicator OX + LSE:  Flood insurance
PCC:  
Fire insurance and  
market commitments
IVM:  
Property insurance
IIASA:  
EU Solidarity Fund
Ec
on
om
ic
Co
st
Ambiguous - Government’s 
impact assessment states 
that Flood Re is not value 
for money, but justifies it as 
it formalises the previous 
cross-subsidisation, so not 
creating a new degree of 
subsidies.
The ABM does not provide 
a precise estimate of how 
costly Flood Re will be for 
the economy.
Low - Premium not 
affordable due to the 
absence of information 
to calculate premiums.
Ambiguous - expansion 
of insurance can promote 
growth of the insurance 
sector or facilitate develop-
ment of economic activity, 
however insurance tends to 
require government support, 
which can be expensive.
High - Although 
annual budget is 
maximised at EUR 
500M, can be still 
costly, considering 
increasing losses and 
potential political 
pressure for compen-
sation.
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
Co
st
Ambiguous - Flood Re is the 
result of a 4-year negotia-
tion between industry and 
government, the new sche-
me is a new not-for-profit 
body with its own adminis-
tration and its own rein-
surance purchasing arm. 
Qualitative investigation 
highlights the complexities 
of the negotiations (Sur-
minski and Eldridge 2015).
Not relevant
Moderate - can be low due 
to large number of policyhol-
ders resulting in economies 
of scale, but high if stronger 
link to DRM is introduced 
due to greater monitoring 
and enforcement costs. 
Private insurers state 
transaction costs as reason 
for not strengthening link 
between premiums and 
DRM. Competitive markets 
can help to keep transaction 
costs as low as possible.
Moderate - Standar-
dised procedure has 
been simplified by 
the recent reforms, 
but reporting requi-
rements and monito-
ring  are extensive.
In
ce
nt
iv
is
e 
D
RM
Moderate - Flood Re itself 
not designed to incentivise 
DRM, but modelled results 
show insurers could create 
incentives for homeowners 
to implement DRM mea-
sures.
High - insurance appli-
cation requires a Forest 
Management Plan and 
a Plan for Forest Fire 
Defense.
Ambiguous - can score 
very highly incentivising 
household level DRM if there 
is strong link between DRM 
and insurance premiums in 
areas of high risk. In areas 
where link with DRM is 
weaker or risk is not high, 
insurance is not able to 
incentivise DRM.
Moderate - Recent 
reforms better 
linked the Fund with 
DRM but only in the 
context of flood risk. 
Link could be further 
strengthened.
Annex: Table 4.4. 
Synthesis assessment of insurance instruments for DRM.
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So
ci
al
Re
du
ce
 In
eq
ua
lit
y
Moderate - Success of the 
scheme should be visible 
in terms of stability in local 
housing markets, which 
can be linked to inequality 
where residents in deprived 
or less affluent areas may 
be concentrated in areas 
at higher risk of flooding. 
Modeling shows scheme 
alleviates unaffordable 
insurance premiums - mar-
ginal effect on number of 
mortgage payments beco-
ming unaffordable / house 
repossessions.
Low - It does not reduce 
inequalities at this stage 
since it only benefits 
owners of large proper-
ties. No subsidies are in 
place.
Low - It is not a role of 
insurance to directly reduce 
inequality. Insurance may 
have display a minor role in 
preventing the worsening 
of inequality after a disaster 
by providing compensation 
payments to help people get 
back on their feet, but role 
would only come into play 
after a disaster.
Low -  Considering 
current rules, the 
Fund allocates more 
aid as a percentage 
of eligible costs to 
those countries most 
able to withstand the 
financial impact of 
disasters.
A
ff
or
da
bi
lit
y
Moderate - Qualitative ana-
lysis suggests that this is the 
overarching aim of Flood 
Re. The ABM indicates that 
Flood Re will succeed, even 
under climate change scena-
rios, but the technical price 
and the subsidised price 
for insurance are expected 
to diverge more and more, 
raising questions about the 
temporary nature of Flood 
Re and its aim to lead to a 
free market system.
Low - Affordable only for 
large properties in good 
economic situation.
Moderate - Affordability 
can prove problematic for 
some (potential) policyhol-
ders if the link with risk if 
increased as proposed then 
high risk households (with 
risk adverse insurers) will 
face very high premiums. 
However, the increased use 
of risk based pricing means 
less cross subsidisation and 
lower insurance premiums 
for those at lower risk.
High - Easily affor-
dable for most MS 
as they contribute 
based on economic 
performance.
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Po
lit
ic
al
 a
nd
 In
st
itu
tio
na
l
Co
ve
ra
ge
Moderate to high - Scope 
and coverage of Flood Re 
extended to cover a wider 
range of property types, but 
excludes new built (post 
2009) as well as SMEs.
Low - Only applies for 
associates of forest 
organisations in the 
South of Chamusca (large 
properties).
Low to moderate - Insurance 
is targeted against specific 
perils to compensation if 
the peril occurs providing 
limited problem coverage. In 
the presence of a strong link 
between DRM and insurance 
premiums insurance may 
additionally increase the 
prominence of DRM activi-
ties in society.
Moderate to high - 
Covers a wide range 
of hazards, but not all 
events qualify for aid.
In
st
itu
tio
na
l f
ea
si
bi
lit
y
N/A
Moderate - Legal 
framework exists but not 
associated to support 
from EU or domestic 
institutions to decrease 
premium costs.
High - Several countries 
have developed the required 
institutions for a viable 
insurance market with risk 
based premiums. Feasibility 
of increasing the link with 
DRM will be dependent on 
the extent to which the mar-
ket deviates from risk based 
premiums.
High - Full feasibility
Co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
Moderate - Investment in 
SUDS or combination of 
SUDS and PLPMs can sta-
bilize insurance premiums 
over time, a clear indicator 
that surface water risk 
management is essential to 
maintain viability of flood 
insurance.
Low - No consistency 
with other instruments.
Ambiguous - Dependent 
with the link of DRM. The 
stronger the overall link 
with DRM the more able 
insurance is reinforce the 
increased resilience against 
natural hazards.
High - Consistent
Ac
ce
pt
ab
ili
ty
 to
 o
th
er
 in
te
-
re
st
 g
ro
up
s
High - ABM highlights that 
property developers and 
local gov could contribute 
to flood risk reduction; 
benefits seen as surface 
water flood risk is reduced 
in modelled area, and 
where these investments 
are considered by insurer, 
households benefit from 
lower premiums.
Moderate - Possibly well 
accepted by other inte-
rest groups besides cur-
rent users if premiums 
would be lowered.
Ambiguous - The scoring is 
dependent on the interest 
group. The possible reforms 
will result in certain pre-
miums will increase (reduce) 
limiting (improving) the 
acceptability of the reform.
Moderate - Strong 
concerns from some 
stakeholders – e.g. 
insurance industry.
Co
nd
iti
on
s 
an
d 
ba
rr
ie
rs
Ambiguous - Investigated 
in the context of DRM 
incentives, ABM explores 
different conditions for the 
Flood Re scheme, found 
differing results depending 
on scenario.
High - Absence of infor-
mation on risk; small 
properties not enticing to 
insurance companies; ma-
nagement areas not de-
veloped to large enough 
degree companies.
High - Potential hikes in 
premiums forms a strong 
barrier. Stakeholder buy in 
limited without considerable 
time and patience expended 
on discussion process
Low
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
di
m
en
si
on
D
ec
re
as
e 
re
-
so
ur
ce
 q
ua
lit
y
N/A
High - Resource quality 
should increase due to 
adequate forest mana-
gement.
Scores very low as property 
insurance is not tied to envi-
ronmental resource quality. N/A
D
e-
cr
ea
se
s-
re
so
ur
ce
 
qu
an
tit
y
N/A
Moderate – improved 
resource quality may lead 
to increased extraction 
rates.
Scores very low as proper-
ty insurance is not tied to 
environmental resource 
quantity.
N/A
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(*)  UPV also analysed the vulnerability during drought periods of agriculture to prices and water availability through an econometric approach
In
ce
nt
iv
is
es
 m
or
e 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
Mixed - Qualitative work 
indicates missing focus on 
broader flood risk context 
(Surminski and Eldridge 
2015), including land-use 
management.
Modeling highlights that 
most beneficial results in 
terms of reduced flood 
risk are realised when full 
range of development and 
government conditions 
are implemented together. 
Also highlights importance 
of coordinating developer 
and local government risk 
reduction strategies.
High - Forest Manage-
ment Plans required
Moderate - in the sense of 
promoting DRM activities. 
Greater interaction between 
insurers and planning agen-
cies can provide guidance on 
the land use management 
strategies that would alter 
the overall risk in an area.
NA
En
ha
nc
e 
bi
od
iv
er
si
ty
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n
N/A
High - Enhances protec-
tion against wildfires.
Very low – property insu-
rance not directly tied to 
protecting biodiversity.
N/A
D
ec
re
as
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ex
te
rn
al
iti
es
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 h
um
an
 h
ea
lth
N/A
High - decreases wildfire 
impacts through the ap-
plication of the Plan for 
Forest Fire Defense.
Very low - May be negative 
implications, as property 
insurance can facilitate eco-
nomic activity leading to an 
increase in the magnitude of 
externalities.
N/A
In
cr
ea
se
 u
se
 o
f l
in
ke
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s
N/A
High - increases most 
ecosystem services 
through the application 
of the Forest Manage-
ment Plan.
Very low - May be negative 
implications, as property 
insurance can facilitate 
economic activity leading to 
increase in the magnitude of 
externalities.
N/A
